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Moral Awareness and Therapist Use of Self
Rick Reinkraut

Introduction	
  
	
  

Among the myriad issues that are of concern to counselors is consideration of the way
the counselor uses her or himself for the benefit of the client. As Combs, Avila and
Purkey (1971) wrote over thirty-five years ago: "The helping professions demand the
use of self as an instrument. Effective operation demands personal interaction. The
helper must have the ability to share himself on the one hand and, at the same time,
possess the capacity for extraordinary self-discipline" (p. 30).
It is this requirement of self-discipline that distinguishes the injunction to "know
thyself" from the demands of the therapist's use of self. Knowing oneself incurs no
obligations regarding how this self-knowledge may impact on others. The selfknowledge that is necessary for a counselor to have in order to use oneself in the
service of the therapeutic benefit of another demands the intentional use of varied
aspects of the self on behalf of another.
In what follows the concept therapist use of self (also referred to as self as instrument)
is discussed addressing why it is important to incorporate into this concept the moral
awareness of the counselor in the service of helping one's clients to affirm that aspect
of themselves. A clinical example is presented to exemplify the issues being discussed.
The discussion addresses moral situatedness within a multicultural world and the
differences between positivism and perspectivism are contrasted. The issue of moral
neutrality on the part of the counselor is discussed. The discussion will conclude with
a proposed framing of the concept of therapist use of self.

The Therapist Use of Self
In the literature on therapist use of self the person of the therapist is regarded as a
central factor in the salutary effects of the therapeutic endeavor. Satir (2000) wrote:
“The person of the therapist is the center point around which successful therapy
revolves” (p. 25).
Similarly, Aponte and Winter (2000) noted that it is within the context of a social
relationship that therapeutic change occurs. They write that “at bottom, the single
instrument each training model actually possesses is the ‘person’ of the therapist in a
relationship with a client” (p. 85).
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Lambert and Barley’s (2001) findings supported the importance of the person of the
therapist. They wrote that the relationship factors between the client and the
therapist are most salient in their contribution to the positive outcome of therapy (see
also Messer and Wampold (2002)). Their conclusion is that attending to the
therapeutic relationship in both practice and research will have more benefit on client
outcome than will a focus on particular therapeutic techniques.
Consistent with these conclusions were the earlier findings of Whiston and Sexton
(1993). They wrote: “More than any other element to date, the therapeutic
relationship is significantly related to positive client outcome… We suggest that the
therapeutic relationship is the foundation from which other activities are built” (p. 45).
This underscores the importance of how a clinician is present in the therapeutic
relationship.
Whereas Satir, and Aponte and Winter affirm the importance of the person of the
therapist within the therapy relationship without naming relevant specifics, Peterson
and Nisenholz (1999) named seven “personal resources” that characterize their
framing of self as instrument. They maintain that the counselor should have acuity in
observing the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the client, should be multiculturally
competent and be able to “break out of their own cultural capsules,” should have the
energy to enter the subjective world of the client in order to help achieve change,
should be able to use clinically appropriate self-disclosure and be able to help the
client articulate his/her concerns. As well the counselor should be able to be
appropriately confrontational and be able to foster an intimate therapeutic
relationship. And lastly, the counselor should be in the process of personal growth (p.
12-13). In their discussion no mention is made of the relevance of the therapist’s
awareness of her or himself as a moral agent.
Yet in the course of living the challenge of confronting the multiplicity of factors with
which persons deal in trying to do what they regard as the "right" course of action is a
matter of considerable significance. In living who does not at times struggle with
competing claims which complicate one's ability to gain clarity regarding the actions
one will take that one regards as the right action to take? Sugarman and Martin (1995)
wrote: "…psychotherapeutic conversations, and associated change processes,
inevitably are saturated with moral concerns, whatever the professional/scientific
approach taken or the social cultural context in which psychotherapy occurs" (p. 344).
A great challenge in living is the challenge of taking responsibility for the actions that
follow from one’s choices.
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In critiquing contemporary psychology, Cushman (2002) wrote:
It seems likely that by uncritically colluding with the social forces pushing psychology
towards ever-more market-driven and scientistic therapy practices, we are in the
process, inadvertently or not, of shaping a psychology that …. erodes the one quality of
personhood that I would suggest is universal in and indispensable to humankind: the
ability to think of oneself as a moral and civic being and to practice moral discourse and
have the capacity for moral action. (p. 112)
By including the importance of moral awareness in the concept of therapist use of
self, this dimension of personhood is affirmed as relevant and important for
consideration and development.

A Clinical Vignette
Regarding assuming responsibility for one's choices, I recall a psychotherapy client
with whom I worked some years ago. He was a white male graduate student in his late
twenties. His parents lived in another part of the country. While not his presenting
concern, he soon was focusing on his discomfort with not having “come out” to his
parents. He was socially and politically active as a gay man within his community at
his university. He was thoughtful and clear regarding his commitments to combat the
sources and consequences of 'homoppression' (the term 'homopression' is intended
to highlight the oppressive effects on gay/lesbian persons of homophobic behavior,
attitudes, fears be they on the part of others or the gay or lesbian persons own
internalized homophobia).He was in an enduring relationship with his male lover
whom he had met shortly after starting graduate school. He struggled with the
competing concerns of on the one hand being committed to being open in the world
about being gay, and on the other hand not wanting to cause distress to his parents to
whom he was devoted. Over the course of our work together it became clear to me, as
it was to him, that his respect for himself was being compromised by not coming out
to his parents. I explored with him if his diminished self-respect reflected his sense
that he was not living up to his moral values and commitments, particularly the value
that he placed on honesty and integrity. He believed that it did and decided that it was
past time for him to act in terms of these moral commitments. We spent some time
exploring how he might approach his parents, which he subsequently did. He was able
to deal sensitively with their surprise and initial distress, in large part he said because
it was so clear to him that he was acting in ways that were consistent with his moral
principles.
At the time of our work I recognized that I could have encouraged him to focus on his
feelings of diminished self-respect without addressing the matter of his moral
commitments. I chose otherwise because I had come to understand from what he had
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told me that the kind of person he was in the world mattered deeply to him, that is, a
person who acted in terms of his moral principles.

Moral Situatedness
The approach that I took is consistent with the position that Doherty (1995) speaks to.
He wrote:
Just as therapists do not supply clients with feelings and desires but rather help clients
discover and work better with them, the same is true for moral beliefs and sensibilities.
The client brings to therapy the moral raw material that we work with collaboratively;
people are continually explaining and justifying their own behavior and evaluating the
morality of others’ behavior. The therapist is a consultant in this ongoing process of
moral reflection. (p. 39)
In my work with the client, among other things, I served as a moral consultant.
Roffman (1996), in her discussion of the use of self as instrument in clinical training
took the view that the subjective experience of the clinician must be understood
within the broader context of the social/cultural realities within which that
subjectivity is experienced. Roffman’s position places upon the clinician the
expectation that one comes to understand the situatedness of one’s subjectivity
within the broader socio-cultural contextual reality of one’s life. Within this sociocultural reality resides the moral values of the larger culture of which one is a part as
well as the moral perspectives that one comes to develop as an individual. An
awareness of the points of agreement and disagreement between oneself and one’s
socio-cultural context serves to clarify where one places oneself in the broader
landscape of one’s lived experience. This awareness also helps to increase one’s
attention to the differences that may exist between oneself and one’s clients
regarding socio-cultural experiences and moral perspectives.
Writing about ethics and morality in psychology, Prilletensky (1997) stated: "Ethics,
according to Sidgwick (1922), is the 'study of what is right or what ought to be, so far
as this depends upon the voluntary action of individuals' (p.4). In this sense, a right
moral action is that which enhances the well being of others (Franken, 1963;
Halberstam, 1993; Singer, 1993; Williams, 1972). This is the primary concern of ethics
and morality" (p. 6 517). The notion of "well-being" is one that is bounded to cultural
norms and therefore imbedded in culturally determined concepts of what constitutes
a right moral action.
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Christopher (2001) discusses the culture-based nature of moral perspectives. He
wrote: "I use the term moral visions to refer to the constellations of cultural values
and assumptions that constitute our understanding of the nature of the person and
the good life" (p.120). He goes on to say: "Moral visions are central themes running
through the drama of culture and combine to help constitute the total web of
meaning and significance we call culture" (p. 126).
It is within the therapeutic interchange that Christopher sees the opportunity for
clarifying cultural differences between counselor and client regarding moral
perspectives. He sees the dialogic process as providing a unique opportunity for the
counselor to move outside of his or her cultural capsule. He wrote:
If we are not aware that our perspective is limited by the horizon of our own moral
visions, the Other's outlook and behavior can appear pathological, mistaken, distorted,
or even evil to us. Because we are immersed in the background assumptions and
practices of our own culture, it is natural for us as therapists to assume much more than
we can ever fully recognize or articulate. It is only through the willingness to have our
own cultural 'givens' questioned through dialogue that cultural differences can be
bridged….(p. 126)
The recognition of the importance for counselors of multicultural competence (Sue,
Arredondo, McDavis, 1992; Arredondo, Toporek, 2004) is ubiquitous. As Miller (2001)
wrote: "…our diagnoses and treatment goals carry with them implicit moral
commitments that certain ways of living, being, and relating, are good, right or
virtuous, and others are not" (p. 350). His viewpoint is consistent with Hoshmand's
(2003) view that psychological practice has a dual nature, namely, that it is a sciencebased cultural enterprise. This underscores the importance of clinicians fostering a
dialogic process in which the converging and diverging points of their own and their
clients' cultural and moral horizons emerge.
In this context the hermeneutic perspective has particular saliency. Betan (1997)
wrote: "Hermeneutics involves a recognition that the observer is always part of, rather
than detached from, what is being observed… Thus, one cannot intervene in human
affairs without being an active participant in defining dimensions of human conduct
and human worth. In viewing the therapist not as a detached 'analyst' of ethics, who
we are and how we are become as important as what we do in an ethical
circumstance" (p. 353).
As will be discussed later, the relevance of the moral perspective of the counselor has
been over-shadowed by a tradition within psychology of the moral neutrality of the
therapist.

Published by DigitalCommons@Lesley, 2008

16

https://digitalcommons.lesley.edu/jppp/vol4/iss1/4 Journal of Pedagogy, Pluralism, and Practice, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4

The concept of the situatedness of experience was explored by Fay (1996) in his
discussion of the replacement of positivism with perspectivism in social science. He
wrote:
…philosophically the demise of science as the paradigm of intellectual activity is tied to
the death of positivism and the concomitant emergence of perspectivism…in opposition
to positivism which conceives science as the method par excellence for seeing Reality
directly, perspectivism asserts that every epistemic endeavor – including science – takes
place from a point of view defined by its own intellectual and political commitments and
interests. (p. 2)
The implications for psychotherapy of Fay’s comments are clear. Namely, as persons
and as therapists we engage from a particular vantage point. As therapeutic agents
we must own the moral implications no less than the intellectual and political
implications of our commitments and interests.
MacIntyre (1984) speaks to this point in saying: “Every action is the bearer and
expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts; every piece of theorizing
and every expression of belief is a political and moral action” (p. 61). In so saying
MacIntyre reminds us that through our actions we evince the beliefs and
commitments that we hold. In leaving out moral considerations from the
psychotherapeutic conversation, therapists communicate through their silence both a
lack of interest in such matters and the lack of relevance of such matters to the
therapeutic endeavor.

Psychotherapy and Moral Neutrality
The tradition in psychotherapy, however, has been to withhold addressing moral
matters. Doherty (1995) wrote that “A cornerstone of all the mainstream models of
psychotherapy since Freud has been the substitution of scientific and clinical ideas for
moral ideas” (p. 9). In this vein Cushman and Gilford (2000) refer to the profession’s
“prohibition against engaging in moral discourse” (p. 992). It is no wonder that in the
literature on therapist use of self the relevance of the therapist’s moral perspective is
rarely discussed.
Aponte and Winter (2000) wrote:
It is inevitable that therapists will evaluate and judge problems through the lens of their
own worldviews, that they will naturally conjure up goals that fit with their ideals, and
be inclined to propose solutions that fit with their own views of life. Few psychotherapists
will argue today that practitioners can actually be ‘value-neutral’ in therapy (p. 136).

17

Reinkraut: Moral Awareness and Therapist Use of Self

In so saying Aponte and Winter dismissed the vaunted notion of the therapist’s moral
neutrality. The notion of moral neutrality supports the conditions whereby therapists,
by their silence on matters relating to moral responsibility, justice and injustice tacitly
collude with an ahistorical, acontextual framing of individual suffering which results,
as Prilleltensky (1997) wrote, in “attributing excessive weight to individual factors in
explaining social behavior, and by abstracting the individual from the sociohistorical
context” (p. 523).
A tension, then, exists between the goal of supporting the client in making his or her
choices and the goal of not using one’s influence to impose one’s own perspective on
the client’s choices. However, MacIntyre (1984) discussed a difficulty for therapists (as
well as others) in recognizing one’s effect on the choices and actions that another
takes. He wrote:
My own future from my point of view may be representable only as a set of ramifying
alternatives with each node in the branching system representing a point of as yet
unmade decision-making. But from the point of view of an adequately informed
observer provided both with the relevant data about me and the relevant stock of
generalizations concerning people of my type, my future, so it seems, may be
representable as an entirely determinable set of stages. Yet a difficulty at once arises.
For this observer who is able to predict what I cannot is of course unable to predict his
own future in just the way that I am unable to predict mine; and one of the features
which he will be unable to predict since it depends in substantial part upon decisions as
yet unmade by him is how far his actions will impact upon and change the decisions
made by others – both what alternatives they will choose and what sets of alternatives
will be offered to them for choice. Now among those others is me. It follows that insofar
as the observer cannot predict the impact of his future actions on my future decisionmaking, he cannot predict my future actions any more than he can his own; and this
clearly holds for all agents and all observers (p. 96).
In so saying, MacIntyre’s observation has profound implications for psychotherapy. A
therapist may not want to influence, with his/her value system and moral beliefs, the
choices that a client is trying to make and the actions to take. It is inevitable, as
MacIntyre demonstrates, that by virtue of the therapist’s participation in the client’s
sorting out process, the therapist, whether intended or otherwise, impacts on the
client’s decision-making.
MacIntyre makes clear that by virtue of our engagement with our clients we are
affecting the decisions they make and the actions they take. We are not responsible
for their choices and actions (to the extent that the client is capable of being a
responsible agent and the therapist is being ethical), but as MacIntyre asserts we are
certainly implicated in those decisions and actions. In this context Satir (2000) wrote:
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"Once, a man came to my office with a bullwhip in his hand and asked me to beat him
with it so he could become sexually potent. While I believed that it was possible that
his method would work for him, I rejected it on the bases that it did not fit my values. I
offered to help him in other ways and he accepted" (p. 20).
By virtue of her awareness of her values, Satir was in the position of making the choice
to decline to participate with her client in a method of work that was incompatible
with her moral position. She offered an alternative that the client accepted. She did
not attempt to avoid the issue by presenting herself as if she was morally neutral on
this matter, nor did she attempt to impose an alternative method. She engaged with
the client in a way that acknowledged the incompatibilities with which they were
faced and gave him a choice that he took.
The position that Satir took is in line with the perspective articulated above by Aponte
and Winter. It is also consistent with Carl Rogers' articulation of the importance of the
therapist being authentic. For the counselor to pretend to be someone he or she is not
presents the client with a relational encounter in which the client must choose
between his or her perceptions of the authenticity of the counselor and what the
counselor is inauthentically communicating.
Inevitably clinicians are challenged to make decisions regarding their capacity to be of
help to clients given the clients' therapeutic needs. The choices, as helpers, must be
most particularly those aspects of oneself that the counselor believes will be
therapeutically helpful. Certainly that must include a conception of what counts as
being helpful and for what purpose(s). Each theory of psychotherapy addresses itself
to the question of what will be helpful based on its understanding of what has gone
awry. As the earlier cited writers have averred, it is the person of the therapist who
plays a crucial role in the process and outcome of any psychotherapy. As a counselor
one is bound by an ethical requirement not to offer services to a client whose interests
cannot be addressed respectfully and competently.

Clinical Vignette Revisited
Referring back to the clinical vignette discussed above, among the ground rules that I
negotiated with the client (I’ll call him Sam) were that we each had the prerogative to
ask each other any question we cared to and that we each had the prerogative to
answer that question or not. At the start of our work he had told me that he was a gay
man and had asked if I had had experience working with gay people. I told him that I
had. He did not ask about my sexual orientation. He did comment from time to time
that there were ways in which I reminded him of his father and wondered aloud if he
was likely to get the same caring and support from his father that he felt he got from
me if his father knew that he was gay.
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I am a gay man. It matters to me as a political and moral act to be out. That said, in my
work with my clients I believe I have an obligation to place my clinical responsibilities
to my clients ahead of my personal moral commitments. I make self-disclosures to my
clients only when I believe they are in the service of the therapeutic work and when
they do not compromise my sphere of privacy.
Peterson (2002) discussed the ethical practice of self-disclosure. She wrote:
The literature on self-disclosure suggests that an ethical therapist might do well to
consider the following questions before disclosing personal information to a client: (a) Is
this information necessary to protect the client’s informed consent? (b) Is my purpose in
disclosing this information to benefit the client or to benefit myself? (c) Will this
particular client use this information in a way that is helpful? (d) Will disclosing this
information interfere with our therapeutic progress, such as by contaminating the
client’s therapeutic transference? (p. 30)
I believe that the self-disclosure to be discussed meets Peterson's criteria for nonharmful self-disclosure.
It was not until near the end of our work together (considerably after the events
described above) that Sam asked about my sexual orientation. I told him that I would
answer him but first I asked him why he had not asked me that question earlier. He
told me that he had thought about asking me at various times but had felt that it
would be better for him to focus on his experience of me rather than be guided by
labels that might effect what he did or didn’t tell me. I did tell him that I was gay. He
told me that he was glad he hadn’t known before talking with his parents because
having been so open with me without knowing my sexual orientation had made it
somewhat easier to tell his father with the hope that his father would come to accept
him. I cite this as an instance in which clinical judgment led me to be silent regarding
an issue of personal moral significance (being “out” in the world) because of my
judgment regarding the needs of the client.
The purpose in this discussion is not to encourage the imposition of moral
considerations into psychotherapy. Rather, the purpose is to speak on behalf of the
recognition that moral considerations have relevance in psychotherapy and therefore
have relevance for our understanding of the concept of therapist use of self.
Use of Self and Moral Awareness
As the therapist develops the ability to use the self on behalf of the client, the
injunction to do no harm must always be considered. Among the ways that any
clinician can do harm is to impose her or his viewpoint on the client rather than
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supporting the client to develop the viewpoint(s) that serves the client's therapy goals
and life commitments.
Counselors have a responsibility to their clients to delve deeply into themselves in
many ways including those situations in which the counselor has been confronted by
moral dilemmas. The counselor's understanding of these dilemmas and the choices
and actions taken in response to them informs the counselor about his or her
positionality as a moral agent and how one has met what one regards as one's moral
responsibility. In this way one learns about one's own moral situatedness. This selfawareness requires a stepping back from the conceptual landscapes we inhabit in
order to achieve what Hoshmand (2001) describes as “reflexivity, or accounting for
one’s own philosophical biases…” (p. 108).
The following sorts of questions are significant to ask in order to increase this level of
self-awareness: What do you believe is the right way to behave in relation to others
with whom you interact? How do you believe you should act when other's attitudes
and/or behavior cause you to feel oppressed? What obligations do you have to the
community or communities of which you are a member? What obligations do you
have in the face of perceived injustice? What is required to be a morally responsible
person? These are questions that address one's moral perspective. The answers to
these (and like questions) require further exploration. It is important that we go on to
challenge ourselves regarding the reasons for the answers to the questions. In other
words, on what bases do we make the choices we make. This level of reflexivity serves
to increase one’s understanding of one’s relationship to one’s values and moral
positions. In knowing more about oneself in these respects one can use this
knowledge to avoid unintentionally imposing one's own views on those of the client
and thereby increase one's effectiveness in helping the client clarify and affirm her or
his own moral positionality.
The therapist does not cease to be the person he or she is when walking into the
therapeutic encounter. We take ourselves with us wherever we go. If counselors leave
out of therapeutic discourse the reality that each person is an agent in a life that is
lived out in a moral landscape then we contribute to the landscape becoming morally
barren.
The therapist has the responsibility to be present on behalf of the client. It is not to
impose answers on others’ questions. Therapy is a conversation. We have all
participated in vapid conversations. Nothing is gained from them. Benefits are gained
from respectful conversations that address matters of moment that speak to issues of
meaning and relevance. Among those conversations are those that address one's
sense of oneself as a moral agent. They are an aspect of what is involved in being a
person.
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A unique aspect of the field of psychology is that as one looks through the window at
others there is a mirror beside the window at which one can look at oneself. By taking
the occasion to look in the mirror one has the additional opportunity to examine one's
own values, moral perspective, confusions and uncertainties. This is in the service of
enhancing one's reflexivity.
Whatever may differ between oneself and one's client, each is a person. Certainly the
differences between persons matter profoundly. In order to be competent clinicians
one must be aware of the differences between oneself and each person with whom
one works and strive to understand, respect, and honor those differences in order to
be aware of and sensitive to their meaning and moment to and for the client.

Conclusions
In the moral arena, as in others, one cannot know in what ways one is different from
another until one situates oneself somewhere. Whatever may be the pretensions of
psychology to moral neutrality, in the lived experience persons are not morally
neutral. Each of us is morally positioned. Whether or not one’s position is fully
articulated, each person takes action in the moral realm and has responsibility for
those actions and their consequences. If psychotherapy is not to be irrelevant to the
lived experiences of real persons it must recognize, honor and embrace the moral
aspects of human life. As counselors we must examine and re-examine where as
persons we position ourselves within a moral landscape. As discussed earlier, Fay,
Christopher, and Betan enjoin us to recognize that there is a point of view, a
perspective, from which one articulates one's moral situatedness. In this way we can
help ourselves to gain increasing clarity about where each one of us is situated in our
respective landscapes and examine more deeply the values, assumptions, attitudes,
axioms that characterize the moral perspective from which one views the world. We
thereby increase our reflexivity and concomitantly decrease the likelihood that we
will, because of a lack of awareness, impose our moral viewpoints. This is in the
service of supporting clients in meeting the challenges they face and thereby more
effectively using the persons we are in being present with our clients. In this
discussion the focus has been on the inclusion of moral awareness in the
understanding of the concept of therapist use of self. There are many aspects of
ourselves that are relevant to how one is present with a client. Each of these aspects
must be used consciously and purposefully on behalf of the client. With this in mind I
propose that therapist use of self be understood to mean the intentional use by the
therapist of his or her abilities, experience, identity, relational skills, moral awareness,
knowledge and wisdom in the service of the therapeutic benefit of the client.

Published by DigitalCommons@Lesley, 2008

22

https://digitalcommons.lesley.edu/jppp/vol4/iss1/4 Journal of Pedagogy, Pluralism, and Practice, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4

References

Aponte, H.J., & Winter, J.E. (2000). The person and practice of the therapist: Treatment
and training. In Baldwin, M. (Ed.). The use of self in therapy (pp. 127-165). New
York, NY: The Haworth Press.
Arredondo, P., & Toporek, R. (2004). Multicultural counseling competencies - ethical
practice. Journal of Mental Health Counseling, 26, 44-55.
Betan, E. (1997). Toward a hermeneutic model of ethical decision making in clinical
practice. Ethics and Behavior. Vol 7, No. 4, 347-365.
Combs, A.W.; Avila, D. L.; Purkey, W. (1971) Helping Relationships, Basic concepts for the
helping professions. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.
Christopher, J. C. (2001). Culture and psychotherapy: toward a hermeneutic
approach. Psychotherapy, 38, 115-128.
Cushman, P. (2002). How psychology erodes personhood. Journal of Theoretical and
Philosophical Psychological, 22, 103-113.
Cushman, P., & Gilford, P. (2000). Will managed care change our way of
being? American Psychologist, 55, 985-996.
Doherty, W.J. (1995). Soul searching. New York, NY: Basic Books
Fay, B. (1996) Contemporary philosophy of social science. Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Publishers, Inc.
Hoshmand, L.T. (2001). Psychotherapy as an instrument of culture. In Slife, B.;Williams,
R.; Barlow, S. (Editors). Critical issues in psychotherapy (pp. 99-113).Thousand
Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications.
Hoshmand, L. T. (2003). Applied epistemology and professional training in a sciencebased cultural enterprise. The Counseling Psychologist, 31 (5), 529-538.
Lambert, M.J., & Barley, D.E., (2001) Research summary on the therapeutic
relationship and psychotherapy outcome. Psychotherapy, 38, 357-361.
MacIntyre, A. (1984). After Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

23

Reinkraut: Moral Awareness and Therapist Use of Self

Messer, S., Wampold, B. (2002). Let's face facts: Common factors are more potent than
specific therapy ingredients. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice. Vol. 9,No.
1, 21-25.
Miller, R.B. (2001). Scientific vs. clinical-based knowledge in psychology: A concealed
moral conflict. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 55 (3), 344-356.
Peterson, J.V. & Nisenholz, B. (1999). Orientation to Counseling. Boston, MA: Allyn and
Bacon.
Peterson, Z. D. (2002). More than a mirror: the ethics of therapist selfdisclosure. Psychotherapy, 39, 21-31.
Prilleltensky, I. (1997). Values, assumptions, and practices: Assessing the moral
implications of psychological discourse and action. American Psychologist, 52,
517-535.
Richardson, F.C. & Fowers, B.J. (1998). Interpretive social science. American Behavioral
Scientist, 41, 465-495.
Roffman, E. (1996). A class conscious perspective on the use of self as instrument in
graduate clinical training. Women & Therapy, 18, 165-179.
Satir, V. “The therapist story.” In Baldwin, M. (Ed.) (2000). The use of self in therapy
(pp.17-27). New York: The Haworth Press.
Sue, D. W., Arredondo, P., & McDavis, R. (1992). Multicultural counseling competencies
and standards: a call to the profession. Journal of Counseling & Development,
70, 477-486.
Sugarman, J., Martin, J. (1995). The moral dimension: A conceptualization and
empirical demonstration of the moral nature of psychotherapeutic
conversations. The Counseling Psychologist. Vol. 23, No. 2. 324-347.

Published by DigitalCommons@Lesley, 2008

24

